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BOOKS REVIEWED
LEGAL RESTRAINTS ON RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT.
By Michael I. Sovern. New York: The Twentieth Century Fund,
Inc., 1966. Pp. 270. $6.00.
This book deals with a variety of legal measures which have been
adopted to restrain discrimination in employment. Chapter I out-
lines the basic problem by discussing the vicious circle of unemploy-
ment, poverty, and inadequate opportunity which has trapped Negroes
in inferior economic positions. Chapter II discusses the Fair Employ-
ment Practices Commissions (FEPC's) created by President Roose-
velt, under pressure from Negroes, during World War II. Sovern
concludes that "the five years of federal fair employment practices
regulation saw Negroes make enormous gains in the labor market."
He concedes, however, (in what is surely an understatement) that
"some of these gains were undoubtedly attributable to the wartime
manpower shortage."1
Chapter III deals with state fair employment practices laws. Sovern
concludes that the evidence is inconclusive concerning the impact of
the state FEPC's on employment, but notes that "discrimination in
employment remains common... in the very states that have outlawed
it."'2 He attributes the limited impact of the FEPC's to: the agencies'
inadequate powers of initiation; inadequate budgets and heavy respon-
sibilities; difficulties in proving discrimination; inadequate remedies
for those found guilty; the commissions' fear of adverse reaction from
businessmen and union leaders; and the commissions' excessive timi-
dity. Excessive timidity manifests itself in the rarity of probable cause
findings, protracted conciliation efforts, and soft settlements. The
author notes, moreover, that other government agencies fail to help the
commissions as much as they might. He concludes :'
While the performance of the commissions seems disappointing when
measured against either their potential performance or the job to be
done, their accomplishments become impressive when it is remembered
that they were wholly without precedent as recently as twenty-five years
ago. If this discussion has tended to emphasize the shortcomings to the
exclusion of the gains, it is because the time for laurel-resting is not yet
at hand, because the gains are quickly digested leaving only the indiges-
tible shortcomings, and because we must be concerned now with the next
tuenty-five years, not the last.
1 P. 15.
'P. 31.
'P. 60.
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Sovern offers a number of suggestions for overcoming the shortcomings
listed above.
Chapter IV deals with the Civil Rights Act of 1964.1 The author
wrote this chapter before the Equal Employment Opportunity Com-
mission (EEOC), which administers the employment sections of the
act, had issued some of its interpretations and his analysis therefore
depends mainly on the statuatory text and the act's legislative history.
This is nevertheless one of the best chapters in the book; it contains a
thorough discussion of the provisions of Title VII, deals realistically
with the act's limitations, and makes imaginative suggestions for im-
provement. Sovern points out very clearly that Title VII has very
weak enforcement procedures because, if the EEOC is unable to re-
solve a case after "conference, conciliation, and persuasion," the com-
plainant must file a suit in federal district court. Such suits are likely
to be expensive, time-consuming, and uncertain as to their outcome.
The author points out, however, that the complainant might get effec-
tive relief by turning to the Justice Department, because Title VII
provides that "upon timely application, the court may, in its discre-
tion, permit the Attorney General to intervene in such civil action if
he certifies the case is of general public importance." Title VII also
permits the Attorney General to sue on his own whenever he "has rea-
sonable cause to believe that any person or group is engaged in a pat-
tern or practice of resistance to the full exercise of the rights herein
described." Because of the EEOC's inadequate enforcement powers,
Sovern believes that the intransigent respondent could successfully
resist the Commission: If the respondent "is polite but firm, it [the
Commission] must eventually go away. At that point, the employer
may be sued by the person harmed but the odds are against it, and if he
does sue, one can always settle with him instead of the Commission. '
The author notes, however, that vigorous cooperation by the Attorney
General, if sustained by the courts, could strengthen the EEOC's con-
ciliation efforts.
Chapter V discusses the use of executive orders issued by various
presidents to curtail discrimination by government contractors. Sov-
ern emphasizes that government contract compliance provisions could
be powerful weapons against discrimination because employers who
might resist the feeble efforts of the EEOC will be reluctant to risk
'78 Stat. 255, 42 U.S.C. § 2000. Section 2000e contains Title VII on Equal Employ-
ment Opportunities.
r P. 80.
[ VOL. 42 :969
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losing lucrative federal contracts. However, the contract compliance
machinery is weakened because labor organizations have not been par-
ties to the contracts. Another weakness of this procedure, not given
adequate attention by Sovern, is the fact that contracts, because of
their importance to the contracting agencies, might be very difficult to
cancel.
Nevertheless, the requirement of affirmative action by government
contractors is very important because it requires contractors to do
things to improve Negro job opportunities which they could not be
compelled to do by law. The so-called voluntary "Plans for Progress"
also are important, as Sovern stresses, because they too encourage em-
ployers and unions to take measures which reach beyond the law. All
the evidence suggests that the contract compliance programs have been
the most effective legal measures to increase Negro employment.
Chapter VI deals with the National Labor relations" and Railway
Labor Acts.' It contains a discussion of the duty of fair representa-
tion imposed upon unions acting as bargaining agents under these laws.
Sovern notes that judicial enforcement of this duty has been inade-
quate because of uncertainties as to the outcome and the expenses to
which the aggrieved individual is put. The author therefore notes the
importance of recent National Labor Relations Board rulings which
promise to give some administrative relief for discrimination. The
Board traditionally had limited enforcement of the duty of fair repre-
sentation to the rarely used remedy of revoking certification from a
union guilty of discrimination against members of the bargaining unit.
Because a majority of unions do not have certification, and because
many of those currently certified would not be significantly damaged
by decertification, this penalty has been almost meaningless. How-
ever, in a series of recent decisions, the Board has ruled that dis-
criminatory agreements will not bar challenges by which other unions
seek to displace discriminating unions as bargaining agents.
But the Board's most significant ruling has been to declare that
failure of the duty of fair representation is an unfair labor practice.,
This ruling in effect makes it possible for a person who has been dis-
criminated against to get administrative relief without having to incur
the expenses of court action. The Board has ruled that discrimination
'49 Stat. 449 (1935), 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1964), as amended, 61 Stat. 136 (1947),
29 U.S.C. § 141 (1964) (Taft-Hartley Act).
7 44 Stat. 577 (1926), as amended, 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-62 (1964).
SMiranda Fuel Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 181 (1962), enforcement denied, 326 F.2d 172
(2d Cir. 1963).
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violates several sections of the National Labor Relations Act, including
section 8 (b) (1), which makes it an unfair labor practice for a union to
restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of their rights to bargain
collectively through representatives of their own choosing. The Board
has interpreted this provision to mean that a union, when acting as
bargaining agent, cannot take "action against any employee upon
considerations or classifications which are irrelevant, invidious, or un-
fair." 9 The Board has ruled, for example, that this section is violated
when a union refuses, for racial reasons, to process the grievances of
Negro members of the bargaining unit.
Section 8(b) (2) of the NLRA makes it an unfair labor practice for
a union "to cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate
against an employee in violation of section (a) (3)." Section (a) (3)
provides that employers shall not be justified in discriminating against
an employee for non-membership in a labor organization if they have
reason to believe that membership was not available to that employee
on the same terms and conditions as other members or if membership
was denied for some reason other than the failure to tender dues and
initiation fees uniformly required as a condition of acquiring or retain-
ing membership. The NLRB has ruled that the unfair treatment of a
worker because of his race violates this section because it is designed
to encourage membership in a labor organization. Sovern supports the
Board's ruling, because "whatever the reason given, whenever a union
causes an employer to treat a nonmember arbitrarily, membership in
the union is encouraged."' 0 This seems to be rather strained logic in
those cases where the union has segregated locals or will not admit
Negroes. Section 8(b) (2) clearly gives relief in cases where a labor
organization tries to enforce closed shop conditions, but it is more
difficult to extend this doctrine to cases where members of the bar-
gaining unit are unfairly treated because of their race and not because
of their union membership.
The NLRB also has ruled that a union violates section 8(b) (3)
when it fails to represent workers fairly. This section makes it an un-
fair labor practice for a union "to refuse to bargain collectively with
an employer, provided it is the representative of his employees."
Although the NLRB's ruling that failure of the duty of fair represen-
tation is an unfair labor practice has important implications for dealing
with racial discrimination by unions, it remains to be seen if the
9Miranda Fuel Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 181, 185 (1962).
'0 P. 166.
[ VOL., 42: 969
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Board's rulings will be upheld. Doubt arises because of the Miranda"
decision (which was not a racial case) in which the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals refused to enforce an order against a union which the
Board found to have violated its duty of fair representation. Doubt also
arises because of Congress' refusal in the past to explicitly make racial
discrimination an unfair labor practice. Sovern gives little weight to
this objection on the ground that Congress implicitly accepted the
Steele"2 case (in which the Supreme Court applied the duty of fair
representation to a railway labor organization) when it passed the
1947 Taft-Hartley Act and did nothing to overturn that ruling. Sov-
ern's argument is not convincing because at the time of Taft-Hartley
the NLRB had limited its rulings to threats to revoke certification, a
power which it clearly possessed. In the absence of certification, the
union's bargaining rights are protected by its economic power and not
by the NLRB unless the employer commits unfair labor practices
specified in section 8. Sometimes, of course, actions taken against
Negroes-such as discharging them for union membership or the lack
of it-is clearly an unfair labor practice, not because of the racial
discrimination, but because such actions would be illegal if taken
against any worker.
Chapter VII deals with the remedies for discrimination in appren-
ticeship programs. Sovern's treatment of this subject is centered
around the case of Lefkowitz v. Farrell' in which the New York Com-
mission for Human Rights found a sheet metal workers joint appren-
ticeship committee and Sheet Metal Workers Local 28 guilty of dis-
crimination. The Commission was compelled to go to court to enforce
its ruling, and, in 1965, three years after this case started, the first
Negro apprentice entered the New York sheet metal workers program.
Sovern feels that Lefkowitz demonstrates: the need for commissions
to have the power of initiation; the dangers involved in delaying public
hearings; the need for objective standards in the selection of appren-
tices; and the need to disseminate apprenticeship information.
Although the reviewer agrees that all of the foregoing are important
needs in the apprenticeship area, they dearly are not sufficient con-
ditions to get more Negroes into these programs. Since the Attorney
General of New York filed charges in this case, a complaint dearly
" Miranda Fuel Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 181 (1962).
" Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 323 U.S. 192 (1944).
" Race Re]. L. Rep. 393 (Spring, 1964), ,nodified sub nor State Comm'n for Human
Rights v. Farrell, 43 Misc. 2d 958, 252 N.Y.S.2d 649 (Sup. Ct. 1964).
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was not necessary for the commission's action. Indeed, there is no
evidence that those commissions which have the power to initiate ac-
tion against joint apprenticeship committees have had any greater
success than the New York commission in getting Negroes into ap-
prentice programs. Similarly, the Secretary of Labor has imposed ob-
jective standards for the selection of apprentices but these have not
caused many Negroes to be admitted; indeed, it can be shown that
objective standards often cause fewer Negroes to enter programs.
Negroes usually have inferior education to whites and do not do as well
on so-called "objective" tests. Experience also demonstrates that anti-
discrimination measures alone will have very little effect on getting
Negroes into apprenticeship programs. This is due in large measure to
the difficulties involved in implementing legal remedies against these
largely voluntary programs. Anti-discrimination measures focus only
on part of the problem. The absence of Negroes from apprentice
programs is due to many factors other than discrimination. Laws
which focus only on discrimination are therefore likely to produce
limited results. Moreover, anti-discrimination laws focus only on the
demand side of the problem; unless measures are taken to increase
the supply of qualified Negro applicants simultaneously, not many
Negroes will enter apprentice programs. The reviewer concludes,
therefore, that anti-discrimination laws are necessary but not sufficient
conditions for increasing the number of Negro apprentices. The laws
are important because they can be used by those who want to accept
Negroes as excuses for doing so where there is opposition from white
workers or customers. But in the case of apprenticeship, we are dealing
with a situation where there often are strong resistances to accepting
Negroes or whites.
Chapter VIII contains a few of the author's perspectives on the
problem of legal remedies for discrimination in employment. He ob-
serves that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act is a "poor, enfeebled
thing" which has "the power to conciliate but not to compel." The
state commissions are "robust in constitution" but "weak in action."
The federal contracting programs are powerful "but can reach no far-
ther than the presidential orders creating it allow." Sovern points out,
however, that all of these instruments are complemented by powers
given to the Attorney General of the United States, the NLRB and
the Department of Labor.
Sovern also outlines the provisions of a model fair employment
[ VOL. 42: 969
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practices law which would be comprehensive in its proscriptions and
coverage and would empower and direct its enforcement agency to
initiate investigations, receive and act on complaints, and enter into
settlement agreements. The model law also would provide for judicial
enforcement and would empower the agency to require appropriate
remedies, conduct reviews to ensure compliance with agreements and
orders, and engage in educational activities. Finally, the model law
would provide for judicial review of the agency's orders.
Sovern argues for the retention of a variety of anti-discrimination
agencies on the grounds that "the realities of politics and the limits of
human capabilities require a multi-front assault on employment dis-
crimination."'1 4 He feels, however, that efforts should be made to
coordinate the activities of the variegated agencies now working in
the anti-discrimination field.
This book would be very useful to legislators, civil rights organiza-
tions, human rights agencies, and others concerned with the problem of
discrimination in employment. It is clearly written in language readily
understandable by those without legal training. It also contains thor-
ough interpretations of the variety of anti-discrimination laws which
have been adopted since the Second World War and makes imagina-
tive suggestions for improving those laws. The book also contains
some excellent suggestions for improving the legal restraints on dis-
crimination in employment. These measures would prove valuable
parts of an overall program-which would include effective manpower
and training measures-to improve Negro employment patterns.
F. Ray Marshall*
"P. 207.
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